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the question of power is central to the study of politics. Thomas Hobbes has 
been hailed as the author of the greatest political philosophy written in the english 
language,1 and indeed as the philosopher of power par excellence.2 nonetheless, i 
argue that conceptualizing political power is a problem for Hobbes. He starts with 
a commonsense view that understands the power of individuals as their natural 
faculties, and that then envisages these powers being compounded together by 
covenant to form the power of a commonwealth. However, i argue that between 
his early and late texts,3 Hobbes finds it necessary to modify his account, in three 
respects. First, individual power is reconceived as a socially constituted capac-
ity, potentially unrelated to natural faculties; second, human powers are now 
understood constantly to form combinations, even without covenant; and third, 
a distinction emerges between the causal capacity (potentia) and the authority 
(potestas/imperium) of the sovereign, where these had previously been conflated.4
Hobbes wrote his works during a period of political ferment; there will surely 
be an illuminating contextual story that can be told to explain his changed view of 
political power. However, rather than reconstituting this external historical causal-
ity, my argument focuses on the internal conceptual difficulties of the earlier view, 
and how they are overcome in the later one. The threefold change in the concept 
of political power reflects a changed diagnosis of the problem of politics. it is not 
enough to defend a doctrine of the authorized power of the sovereign; such a 
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1 Oakeshott, “introduction,” viii.
2 Macpherson, “introduction,” 9–10. For Oakeshott, “Hobbes’s philosophy is, in all its parts, pre-
eminently a philosophy of power” (“introduction,” xxi).
3 For the purposes of this paper, i consider Hobbes’s early political works to be The Elements of 
Law (1640) and De cive (1642), and his late political works to be Leviathan, both the english (1651) 
and latin (1668) editions.
4 although in english this distinction is obscured under the single term ‘power,’ nonetheless i am 
able to differentiate between the concepts even in the english texts by comparison of passages, most 
directly between the english and latin Leviathan.
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doctrine must be robustly complemented by an account of how the effective power 
commensurate to this authority might be achieved.5 nor is this straightforward: 
for effective political power is not a stable object of possession; rather, it can vary, 
sometimes severely. Hobbes’s Leviathan (L) takes significant steps to correct his 
earlier texts’ preoccupation with power as entitlement and neglect of effective 
power.6 in this light, the prevalent juridical7 accounts of Hobbes’s political phi-
losophy are inadequate.8 
1
in this first part of the paper, i reconstruct Hobbes’s view of power in his early 
political works The Elements of Law (EL) and De Cive (DC), establishing three points 
in particular. First, individual human power is conceived as faculties; second, the 
only politically salient way in which these powers are combined is via a formal 
covenant; and third, the power of the sovereign is the result of such a covenant.
1.1
in his early texts,9 Hobbes frequently uses the term ‘power’ interchangeably with 
‘faculties.’10 a human individual’s power is “the faculties of body and mind . . . that 
is to say, of the body, nutritive, generative, and motive; and of the mind, knowledge” 
(EL i.8.4).11 This is not implausible: in common usage power means something 
like the capacity to do things, and faculties are nothing but the specific capacities 
belonging to me by which i can do things. However, Hobbes very promptly moves 
on to make a broader use of the term ‘power,’ extending it to encompass what i 
call ‘secondary powers’:
5 in an influential paper, Hoekstra explores the sense in which the possession of potentia gives 
rise to potestas/imperium; he does not explore the reverse problem, of how potentia adequate to potestas 
might be achieved (“The De Facto Turn in Hobbes’s Political Philosophy,” 33–35).
6 Such neglect is not unique to Hobbes’s early texts. it is also is evident in contemporary consti-
tutionalism, in the tendency to grasp the power of a particular branch of government or of a church 
as that power that it is attributed to it legally, via explicit constitutional provision, to the neglect of the 
question of its effective power. The disparity between these terms is particularly stark when the USa 
and the UK are juxtaposed: the fact of the establishment of a church in the UK and the explicit anti-
establishment principle in the US constitution do not go very far in illuminating the actual ascendency 
of religion in politics in the two countries.
7 i use ‘juridical’ in a general sense to mean concerned with power as authority, not in a more 
specific sense to mean concerned with law, positive or otherwise.
8 The dominant interpretation of Hobbes’s texts understands his doctrine of sovereign power 
entirely as a doctrine of authorized power. For instance, Baumgold, Hobbes’s Political Theory; Hamp-
ton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition; Johnston, The Rhetoric of leviathan: Thomas Hobbes and the 
Politics of Cultural Transformation; Martinich, Hobbes; Oakeshott, “introduction”; Oakeshott, Hobbes on 
Civil Association; Sorell, Hobbes; Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and its Genesis; Tuck, 
Hobbes; Warrender, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, His Theory of Obligation; and Watkins, Hobbes’s System 
of Ideas: A Study in the Political Significance of Philosophical Theories.
9 For this argument, i focus primarily on The Elements of Law. De cive offers only a compressed 
overview of a science of man, deferring full treatment to De homine (Hobbes, “On Man”; latin text in 
Hobbes and Molesworth, Thomæ Hobbes Malmesburiensis Opera, vol. 2). However, by my periodization, De 
homine is a later text (post-Leviathan), and consequently not relevant for establishing Hobbes’s early view.
10 EL i.1.4; EL i.14.1.
11 De cive states that human nature consists in these faculties (DC, Chapter i, Section 1).
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[S]uch farther powers, as by them [the faculties of body and mind] are acquired 
(viz.) riches, place of authority, friendship or favour, and good fortune; which last is 
really nothing else but the favour of God almighty. (EL i.8.4)
This extension also remains plausible: many things that i do are done not directly 
with my natural faculties, but through the mediation of these secondary powers. 
if i have friends or riches, then it will be easier for me to bring about whatever i 
want to achieve. But are secondary powers powers in the proper sense?12 i claim 
to the contrary, Hobbes’s analysis of power always privileges natural faculties, 
conceiving power as the causal potentiality proper and internal to an individual. 
even if Hobbes recognizes secondary powers to be crucially important in human 
life, they are powers only in a derivative sense, as the conduits for or indicators of 
faculties.13 i demonstrate this claim by considering Hobbes’s accounts of equality, 
honor, and glory.
if secondary powers are powers in the proper sense, then they must factor into 
the assessment of an individual’s power. However, to the contrary, when arguing 
that people are more or less equal in power, Hobbes does not see it necessary to 
demonstrate that people’s secondary powers, such as the assistance and favor they 
receive, are equal. rather, the equality of power is established merely by consider-
ing equality in faculties: strength, wit, and knowledge. Correspondingly, the true 
measure of any inequality of power that does exist is determined not through 
comparison of secondary powers, but through the clash of bodily strength (EL 
i.14.1–5; DC i.3–4, i.6).
Honor is the internal conception of the superiority of another person’s power.14 
The signs15 by which power or its excess above that of others can be recognized 
are called honorable. They include not only the direct effects of a power, but 
also effects at several causal steps away from that power, by which its existence is 
indirectly inferred. For instance, “general reputation amongst those of the other 
sex” is honorable as a sign directly consequent of “power generative”; boldness is 
honorable via a more indirect signification: it is “a sign consequent of opinion of 
our own strength: and that opinion a sign of the strength itself” (EL i.8.5). if sec-
ondary powers are powers in the proper sense, then their superiority should merit 
honor, even without reference to faculties. However, to the contrary, whenever 
Hobbes proposes superiority of secondary powers to be honorable, he takes care 
12 numerous commentators take the view that they are; see Goldsmith, Hobbes’s Science of Politics, 
66–71; Hindess, Discourses of Power: From Hobbes to Foucault, 24–25; lazzeri, “les racines de la volonté 
de puissance: le ‘passage’ de Machiavel à Hobbes,” 236–45; Macpherson, The Political Theory of Posses-
sive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke, 35–46; Pettit, Made with Words: Hobbes on Language, Mind, and Politics, 
92–95; read, “Thomas Hobbes: Power in the State of nature, Power in Civil Society,” 505–6; Spragens, 
The Politics of Motion: The World of Thomas Hobbes, 110–11; and Warrender, The Political Theory of Hobbes: 
His Theory of Obligation, 312–13.
13 While most of De cive aligns with this analysis, the third theological part does not, aligning more 
closely with the analysis of the later texts; contrast, for instance, DC i.2–3 with DC xv.13.
14 This could be superiority compared to the power of the beholder, but it could equally be su-
periority compared to the average. For instance, a powerful individual can honor their subordinate 
by praising them (EL i.8.6).
15 a sign is a thing that a person has experienced as regularly occurring antecedent or consequent to 
something else, which they conjecture will occur in this combination again in the future (EL i.4.9–10).
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to trace the chain of signification back to an individual’s possession of a faculty. 
riches are honorable, not because they themselves are power, but “as signs of the 
power that acquired them”; authority is honorable, not because it itself is a power, 
but “because a sign of strength, wisdom, favour or riches by which it is attained” 
(EL i.8.5). Hobbes does not discuss friendship per se, but he does analyze some 
attributes thereof, again reducing them back to faculties: persuasiveness is honor-
able, as a sign of knowledge; “general reputation amongst those of the other sex” 
is honorable, as a sign of bodily vigor (EL i.8.5).
if secondary powers are powers in the proper sense, then it is not vain to glory 
in them. Glory,
or internal gloriation or triumph of the mind, is that passion which proceedeth 
from the imagination or conception of our own power, above the power of him that 
contendeth with us. (EL i.9.1)
a person has reason to glory when their feeling of superiority of power is grounded 
in reality, whereas vainglory is the feeling without the real power. However, Hobbes 
directly denies that association with others gives rise to justifiable glory. “[n]or 
does association with others increase one’s reason for glorying in oneself, since 
a man is worth as much as he can do without relying on anyone else.”16 Similarly, 
Hobbes insists that reliance on fame to achieve glory indicates a lack of power 
(EL i.9.20). in both cases, the secondary power (association, or the deference and 
assistance of those who recognize one’s fame) is not by itself reason for glory; in 
other words, it is not a power in the proper sense.
Thus, despite the initial presentation of secondary powers as powers in their 
own right, they are only incorporated into the analysis insofar as they are reduced 
back to natural faculties:17 they are mere conduits for or indicators of the only 
things properly called powers, which are natural faculties.18
in what i call the “positionality claim,” Hobbes asserts that power is intrinsi-
cally positional.
and because the power of one man resisteth and hindereth the effects of the power 
of another: power simply is no more, but the excess of the power of one above that 
of another. For equal powers oppose, destroy one another; and such their opposition 
is called contention. (EL i.8.4)
The analytical part of this positionality claim is reiterated and relied upon con-
stantly throughout Hobbes’s early texts.19 Capacities are only effective in their 
16 Hobbes, On the Citizen, i.2.
17 There are also other corroborations in the text. First, the definition of secondary powers—
“such farther powers, as by them are acquired” (EL i.8.4)—already indicates that for something to be 
a secondary power, it is necessary that it should have a connection to faculties. Second, Hobbes says 
that power is known by the actions that it produces; he does not countenance that it might be known 
directly, as would be the case if secondary powers such as riches and friends were themselves truly 
powers in their own right (EL i.8.5).
18 Thus, Tuck is mistaken to claim that in the view of The Elements of Law and De cive, “[p]ower is 
itself a matter of belief, as is shown by his [Hobbes’s] discussion of the concepts of glory, false glory 
and vainglory” (Tuck, “introduction,” On the Citizen, xxi).
19 indeed, the analytical part of the positionality claim also reinforces my argument about secondary 
powers. Friendship is one of the key examples of secondary power. if friendship is properly a power, 
then it ought to be consistent with the analytical part of the positional claim, according to which if 
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excess over one another; if you and i race to grab an apple, but i am faster, then 
i have the effective capacity to grab the apple. Your capacity, because compara-
tively inferior, is entirely ineffective. Hobbes elaborates this point in an extended 
reflection on the analogy between human life and a race (EL i.9.21). indeed, his 
definitions of glory, honor, and the honorable all involve comparison of power. 
However, even if the positionality claim is indisputably analytically central, there 
still remains a terminological question. The positionality claim proposes a new 
use of the word ‘power.’ Power is no longer an individual’s capacity (whether their 
faculties or also their secondary powers), but rather the excess of their capacity 
over the capacity of relevant others: for instance, it is the superiority of my strength 
that is a power, not the strength itself. The terminological question asks, in these 
early texts, is the term ‘power’ used equivocally for both these meanings, or is it 
reserved for one or the other? in fact, the use of the term ‘power’ to mean non-
comparative capacity is clearly dominant in the text. To start, Hobbes frequently 
characterizes human power as faculties, not as the comparative excess of faculties 
(EL i.1.4, i.8.4, i.14.1). Furthermore, glory and honor are defined in terms of 
the comparative excess of power; if power already meant this comparative excess, 
Hobbes would need instead to define glory and honor directly in terms of power 
(EL i.8.5, i.9.1). Similarly, if power were already comparative, Hobbes should not 
speak of a situation of equal forces as a situation in which there is equal power, 
but rather no power at all (EL i.14.3). Thus, throughout the text of The Elements of 
Law, Hobbes maintains the term ‘power’ for the faculties: relational comparison 
is crucial to understanding the outcomes of human power, but it is not built into 
the concept of power itself.
1.2
a social ontology is an account of the kinds of entities that exist in the social 
domain.20 The first building block of Hobbes’s early social ontology is the idea 
discussed in section 1.1 that humans are equal in power; a fuller account can be 
reconstructed by considering how these equal powers can be combined. Hobbes 
distinguishes two possible modes of combination. On the one hand, if a number 
of individuals, each retaining their own distinct will, nonetheless coordinate to act 
toward a shared end, then this concourse of their wills is called concord, consent 
or consensio, forming an association or societas. Their wills are temporarily aligned 
but remain distinct (EL i.12.7, i.19.4; DC v.3–5). On the other hand, if a number 
of individuals combine their separate wills through a binding and punitively en-
forced covenant to form a single collective will, then this is called a union (unio, EL 
i.12.8, i.19.6; DC v.6–7). The exemplar of a union is the political commonwealth.
something is a power, its effectiveness lies in its excess over that of others. indeed, it is true that if i 
have more friends than you, then i can achieve more of my ends. However, consider the relation not 
between two enemies who compare the size of their bands of friends, but rather between two friends. 
in friendship, two people’s powers combine to generate more effective power rather than cancelling, 
contrary to the positional claim’s requirements. Thus friendship cannot truly be a power. The same 
reasoning will apply for any informal association: even if such an association is included on the list of 
secondary powers, Hobbes’s analysis shows them not to be powers in the proper sense of the word.
20 Pettit, “rawls’s Political Ontology,” 157–74.
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in principle, human collectivities can be either mere associations or proper 
unions. However, i argue that mere associations have no political salience in the 
early texts. an association may be prompted by “the fear of a present invader, or 
by the hope of a present conquest, or booty; and endureth as long as that action 
endureth” (EL i.19.4).21 But it is impossible for such a federation to deliver last-
ing peace and cooperation, because any unity is rapidly eroded by “differences of 
purpose and policy or by envy and rivalry.”22 To be sure, associations of animals 
such as bees can be durable; but unlike animal associations, human associations 
are destabilized by passions of resentment and envy, by competition for scarce 
goods, and by disagreement on the most prudent way to pursue even ends that 
are shared (EL i.19.5; DC v.5).
This dismissal of associations might seem implausible; surely we can think of 
many groups which are not commonwealths but which are politically significant. 
at the very least, there will be familial groupings that are relatively stable. at one 
level, Hobbes accepts this criticism: he admits that his state of nature poses the 
idea of humans popping up “like mushrooms”;23 whereas it is more realistic to 
imagine a state of nature inhabited by families with children and masters with 
slaves (DC ix). However, Hobbes shows that these allegedly overlooked collectivi-
ties themselves have the structure of a union. The canonical way in which a union 
comes about is by institution: there is an agreement among individuals to establish 
a sovereign over them who represents them as a single will and whom they obey. 
However, union can equally be formed by dominion, conquest, or acquisition: 
an already mighty individual demands that others agree to submit. in both cases, 
agreement is motivated by individuals’ desire for enduring security, and their fear 
of its disruption; but in the former they feel threatened by each other, whereas in 
the latter, they fear a conqueror’s sword (EL i.19.11; DC v.12). The overwhelming 
superiority of force of the parent over the child in a family grouping constitutes a 
union of this latter sort, even if the agreement is not made explicit. it amounts to 
an implicit covenant of submission from the child, and consequently families are 
in fact little commonwealths (EL i.14.13, ii.3.2, ii.4.3, ii.4.10; DC ix).
Thus Hobbes’s social ontology envisages a thoroughly fragmented social sphere, 
capable of redemption only through a covenant establishing external unification 
in the person of a sovereign. But what is the social ontology of the political order 
beneath the sovereign? Hobbes grants there may well be subordinate unions, but 
he does not mention associations (EL i.19.9; DC v.10). associations appear again 
to be considered lacking in political salience; this view is particularly evident in 
Hobbes’s treatment of sedition. a seditious group is any union or association that 
does not actively recognize the sovereign and its authority, or worse, that denies 
it. a discontented multitude can be seditious (EL ii.8.2); but they only constitute 
a real threat to the sovereign if they have “hope of success.” Hobbes argues that 
this hope requires that they cease being a multitude and structure themselves as a 
21 also EL i.19.6; DC v.4. Hobbes stresses the lack of community among humans in contrast to the 
social nature of animals (EL i.19.5; DC v.5).
22 Hobbes, On the Citizen, v.4.
23 Hobbes, On the Citizen, viii.1
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union, consciously deciding to join together and act by a single will under a leader 
(EL ii.8.1, ii.8.11; DC xii.11, xiii.13). For an informal association is not durable 
enough; it will be subject to the same tendency to dissolution as in the state of 
nature. The lack of concern with informal groupings is also reflected in Hobbes’s 
strategy for neutralizing the threat to the commonwealth posed by seditious 
groups. Hobbes offers rhetorical condemnation of would-be leaders of seditious 
unions, belittling their claim to good judgment (EL ii.8.12–15; DC xii.10–13), and 
he recommends to the sovereign that it should deploy harsh punitive measures 
specifically for the ambitious (EL ii.9.7; DC xiii.12). even though there are other 
factors of discontent that conduce to unrest,24 to prevent sedition it is sufficient 
simply to undercut the formation of unions by targeting their would-be leaders.
1.3
i now turn to consider the power of the union that is the commonwealth, or what is 
the same, the power of the sovereign. a natural person’s power is her or his facul-
ties; i argue that we can understand the power of the sovereign in the same way. a 
commonwealth is a union, which is characterized by its possession of a single will. 
This unity of will allows Hobbes to conceive of the commonwealth as a fictional 
(artificial) person (EL i.19.6–8; DC v.6–12).25 Just as a natural person (a human 
individual) has faculties, Hobbes is happy to attribute faculties to the sovereign. 
“For the body politic, as it is a fictitious body, so are the faculties and will thereof 
fictitious also” (EL ii.2.4). These faculties are the faculties of the sovereign con-
ceived in its fictional unity; and this fictional unity is constituted by a covenant in 
which subjects fully transfer their powers (their faculties). Consequently, the power 
of the sovereign, which is its faculties, is the sum of the powers of all its subjects.
For the power [potentia] of the citizens is the power [potentia] of the commonwealth, 
that is, his power who holds the sovereignty [summum . . . habet imperium] in the com-
monwealth. (dC xiii.2)26
The natural faculties of individuals cannot literally be transferred, so instead the 
transfer of faculties consists in obedience to the will of the sovereign. But there are 
two options for understanding this unification of powers: does the power consist 
in the fact that subjects obey (in which case it is in principle variable), or does 
it consist in the obligation of the subjects to obey (in which case it is invariant)? 
even though the sovereign’s power comes from subjects, the sovereign’s power 
is not variable.
[G]overnment [imperium] is a capacity [potentia], administration of government 
[administratio gubernandi] is an act [actus]. Power [potentia] is equal in every kind of 
commonwealth; what differs are the acts, i.e. the motions and actions of the common-
wealth. (DC x.16)27
24 Hobbes recommends some effort to avoid discontent and bad doctrine (EL ii.9).
25 The analogy with the body of a natural person is constantly emphasized. Hobbes speaks of the 
“body politic” (EL i.19.8) and the “person civil” (EL ii.1.1); the “Order” of The Elements of Law divides 
the text into a study of men “as persons natural” and men “as a body politic” (EL xiv).
26 Hobbes, On the Citizen, xiii.2.
27 Hobbes, On the Citizen, x.16.
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This invariability can be understood in light of the grounding of the conception 
of power in the sovereign’s nature as an artificial person. The artificial person 
is not defined by the degree of cooperation actually achieved; such a reliance 
on actual convergence would characterize mere association. an artificial person 
has a stronger unity, bound to the juridical structure of covenant that defines it. 
Correspondingly, Hobbes consistently talks of the sovereign’s power not as the 
combined faculties of individuals that it is in fact able to deploy, but as the right 
to those capacities: “[T]o transfer a man’s power and strength, is no more than 
to lay by or relinquish his own right of resisting him to whom he so transferreth 
it” (EL i.19.10). Obedience does not constitute the sovereign’s power; but rather 
it is an entitlement or something owed to the sovereign in virtue of that power 
(EL ii.1.7; DC v.11, vi.13).28
However, Hobbes anticipates that this debt will generally be met: he stipulates 
the sovereign is actually able to secure the transfer of subjects’ powers, because 
its use of fear is effective in bending their wills.
and though the will of man, being not voluntary, but the beginning of voluntary 
actions, is not subject to deliberation and covenant; yet when a man covenanteth to 
subject his will to the command of another, he obligeth himself to this, that he resign 
his strength and means to him, whom he covenanteth to obey; and hereby, he that is 
to command may by use of all their means and strength, be able by terror thereof, to frame 
the will of them all to unity and concord amongst themselves (EL i.19.7; my emphasis).29
Hobbes concedes that this bending of wills is not perfect: for he envisages that the 
sword of justice will be needed not only to frighten subjects away from disobedience 
but also to discipline them when they do disobey (EL ii.1.9–10, ii.9.6). nonethe-
less, for the most part actual disobedience is presumed not to be too disruptive; it 
will be a marginal, foolhardy occurrence, not threatening the civil order.
Thus far i have discussed the sovereign’s power in the sense of its potentia. 
Power as potentia is a concept shared across the natural and human domains of 
Hobbes’s science, and has a meaning close to causal capacity. But this is not the 
only or primary question of political power. Traditionally, when in english one 
speaks of the power of a commonwealth, this corresponds to the latin term 
‘potestas’ or ‘imperium,’ which has the overtone of authorized power, or authority. 
indeed, the terms ‘sovereign,’ ‘sovereignty,’ and ‘sovereign power’ are all gener-
ally translated as ‘summa potestas,’ or ‘summum imperium,’ the highest potestas or 
imperium.30 nonetheless, for Hobbes’s early texts, this is a distinction that makes 
no practical difference.31 The sovereign’s potentia is already understood as the 
juridical transfer of the potentiae of subjects, and this is simply equated with the 
authority power (potestas/imperium) of the sovereign.
28 it is incorrect to consider the potentia of the sovereign in these texts as its actual effectiveness 
toward its ends, as do Johnston (The Rhetoric of leviathan: Thomas Hobbes and the Politics of Cultural 
Transformation, 45) and Warrender (The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, His Theory of Obligation, 312–13).
29 See also EL ii.1.6.
30 Silverthorne, “Political Terms in the latin of Thomas Hobbes,” 506–8.
31 Silverthorne, “Political Terms in the latin of Thomas Hobbes,” 506–8.
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This Authority [Potestas], this Right to give Commands, consists in the fact that each of 
the citizens has transferred all his own force and power [suam vim et potentiam] to 
that man or Assembly. (DC v.11)32
The sovereign’s summum imperium (sovereign authority) is equivalent to its potentia 
absoluta (absolute power, DC vi.17).33
2
Throughout his political texts, both early and late, Hobbes aspires to offer a sci-
ence of politics, that is, to put the study of politics on a sure foundation. in these 
texts, scientific understanding is characterized in opposition to mere experience 
or prudence, which simply reports what has occurred or what tends to occur.34 
rather, the crucial aspect of science is good definitions (EL i.5.4–14, i.6.4; L 
iv.12–13, vii.4). For instance, consider the opening discussion of human nature 
in The Elements of Law:
Man’s nature is the sum of his natural faculties and powers, as the faculties of nutri-
tion, motion, generation, sense, reason, etc. For these powers we do unanimously 
call natural, and are contained in the definition of man, under these words, animal 
and rational. (EL i.1.4)
a good definition will contain all and only those properties and powers belong-
ing to a given phenomenon considered in its nature, or in other words, not as an 
isolated particular but as an instance of a larger class. Correspondingly, scientific 
understanding of a given phenomenon subsumes it under a definition, legitimately 
abstracting away from any minor empirical aberrations. To understand a circle 
drawn on paper in front of me, it is important that i understand its principle (that 
it should be constructed by tracing out points equidistant from a given locus); it 
is irrelevant that it may have tiny imperfections in the way it is actually drawn (DC 
epis.5, Pref.9). Thus, a Hobbesian science of man investigates not an individual 
human’s causal effectiveness per se, but the causality proper to her or him as laid 
out in a good definition of her or his nature.35 nonetheless, there are limits to 
this tolerance: science has to have some connection to the reality it purports to 
explain. 36 as with the circle drawn on paper, it is permissible for there to be some 
small imperfection of the phenomenon compared to its scientific model; but 
32 Hobbes, On the Citizen, v.11.
33 Hobbes, On the Citizen, vi.27. See also EL i.19.10; DC x.16.
34 EL epis.xv–xvi, i.1.1, i.4.1; DC epis.4–9, Pref.4, Pref.9, Pref.18; L, Chapter v, Section 17; L ix.
35 in this respect, Hobbes’s science is similar to the scholastic method, viewing power as poten-
tiality proper to an individual and belonging to it. indeed, Brandt demonstrates that Hobbes’s very 
early writings are deeply steeped in the aristotelian system (Thomas Hobbes’s Mechanical Conception of 
Nature, 17). as Spragens puts it, “Hobbes’s idea patterns paralleled those of aristotle to an astonishing 
degree even as he drastically refashioned their contents” (The Politics of Motion: The World of Thomas 
Hobbes, 8). More generally, Hobbes’s science has been characterized as less experimental that that of 
his contemporaries: see anstey, “experimental Versus Speculative natural Philosophy,” 215; Shapin, 
Schaffer, and Hobbes, Leviathan and the Air-Pump, 7.
36 in Oakeshott’s view, “[Hobbes’s] conception of philosophy as the establishment by reasoning 
of hypothetical causes saved him from the necessity of observing the caution appropriate to those who 
deal with facts and events” (“introduction,” xiv). However, on my reading this is unjust.
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this divergence must remain small if the science is to hold its own.37 i argue that 
Hobbes’s later political view in Leviathan finds the aberrations of social and politi-
cal reality from the causality of faculties to be significant; understanding power as 
faculties misses the overwhelmingly social determination of the human capacity 
to achieve ends in the social sphere. This forces a recalibration of his science of 
man, his social ontology and his science of the commonwealth.38
2.1
The phenomenon to be explained by the science of man is human behavior; and 
in light of the science of commonwealth that builds upon it, we see in particu-
lar that the science of man is interested in human social and political behavior. 
Leviathan observes that a person’s causal effectiveness is primarily constituted by 
the aid or forbearance of the informal constellation of people around them. Cor-
respondingly, rather than restrict the ground of individual power to the faculties 
internal to that individual, i argue that Leviathan offers a new analysis by which 
human power is a socially constituted and potentially shifting property. 39 i make 
this argument primarily on the basis of Leviathan chapter x, a recognizable de-
scendent of the analysis of human power in The Elements of Law (EL i.8). The very 
close similarity of the two passages has concealed the deep conceptual change 
37 i concede that in the scholastic tradition to which Hobbes is indebted (see n. 35), there is one 
circumstance under which a scientifically rigorous explanation is exempted from the requirement 
to accord with the actual phenomena whose nature is being explained. For aquinas, most sciences 
are theoretical sciences that explain actual phenomena. By contrast, practical sciences do not even 
purport to do this; for human nature is fallen and so a science of human nature merely explains how 
humans ought to behave. (For a concise characterization of this distinction, see Matheron, “Spinoza et 
la décomposition de la politique thomiste: Machiavélisme et utopie,” 51–54.) However, this exemption 
does not apply to Hobbes’s political works. For in these texts, first, the science of individual human 
power is not presented as a science of duty but as a science of real capabilities (see section 1.1). and 
second, the divergence at issue in the case of the science of the commonwealth concerns not the 
divergence between the model and actually existing commonwealths, but between a commonwealth 
established in accord with Hobbes’s model and Hobbes’s claim that such a commonwealth will func-
tion peacefully (see section 1.3).
38 This has not been noted in existing comparisons of Hobbes’s texts, such as Schuhmann, “Le-
viathan and De cive,” 31; and Tuck, “introduction,” Leviathan, xxxviii.
39 Most commentators do not discuss power/potentia at all. The only commentators who detect a 
change in the analysis of power/potentia across the texts are rudolph (“Conflict, egoism and Power in 
Hobbes,” 73–88); Carmichael (“C. B. Macpherson’s ‘Hobbes’: a Critique,” 361, 368–69); and Mcneilly 
(The Anatomy of leviathan, 144–47). 
The following commentators do discuss power/potentia as a generalized effective capacity and 
observe its relational grounding; however, they err in not discerning any difference in the account 
across Hobbes’s texts (or in some cases explicitly denying any such difference): Foisneau, Hobbes et la 
toute-puissance de Dieu, 202–10, 61–62; Frost, Lessons from a Materialist Thinker: Hobbesian Reflections on 
Ethics and Politics, 131–72; Goldsmith, Hobbes’s Science of Politics, 63, 66–71; Kavka, Hobbesian Moral and 
Political Theory, 93–94; lazzeri, Droit, pouvoir et liberté : Spinoza critique de Hobbes, 61–77, 118–21; lazzeri, 
“les racines de la volonté de puissance: le ‘passage’ de Machiavel à Hobbes,” 236–45; Macpherson, 
“introduction,” 34–38; Macpherson, “Leviathan restored: a reply to Carmichael,” 381 (an explicit 
denial of any change); Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke, 35–46; 
Pettit, Made with Words: Hobbes on Language, Mind, and Politics, 92–95; read, “Thomas Hobbes: Power in 
the State of nature, Power in Civil Society,” 505–6; Spragens, The Politics of Motion: the World of Thomas 
Hobbes, 110–11; Tuck, “The Utopianism of Leviathan,” 129–30; Tuck, “introduction,” On the Citizen, 
xxi; and Zarka, Hobbes et la pensée politique moderne, 129–34.
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from most interpreters; but the closeness of the passages makes the small changes 
i identify more significant.40
Where The Elements of Law defined power as faculties (EL i.8.4), Leviathan opens 
with a definition of power that enshrines a privilege to effects:
The power [potentia] of a man (to take it universally) is his present means to obtain 
some future apparent good. (L x.1)
Secondary powers also find a new definition, supplementing the backward relation 
to faculties in The Elements of Law (EL i.8.4) with a forward relation to effects. They 
are now called “instrumental” powers, and are defined as those “which, acquired 
by these [natural powers] or by fortune, are means and instruments to acquire more” 
(L x.2; my emphasis). Because the criterion for being counted as a power points 
forward to effects, not back to origins, any causal genesis for a power is accept-
able: secondary powers are explicitly included in the general definition of power 
in equal standing with natural faculties (L x.1).
are secondary powers still only powers in a derivative sense? To the contrary, 
i claim that secondary powers are now genuine powers in their own right, and 
this status is not dependent on any connection to natural faculties. The refusal 
to privilege faculties and the shift of focus to effects is systematically reflected in 
examples. Something is honorable if it is a sign of power. in early and late texts 
alike, nobility or good birth are certainly honorable, but in The Elements of Law, it is 
by reflection as a sign of power of ancestors (EL i.8.5), whereas in Leviathan it is a 
sign that one may easily obtain aid (L x.45). riches were previously honorable “as 
signs of the power that acquired them” (EL i.8.5); now “riches joined with liberal-
ity is power, because it procureth friends and servants; without liberality, not so, 
because in this case they defend not, but expose men to envy, as a prey” (L x.4).
The definition of power is thus conceptually different, but does it have the same 
extension? Might it still be the case that human faculties for the most part explain 
humans’ causal efficacy in the social domain? indeed, according to the account 
in the early texts, it so happens that secondary powers are usually only generated 
when there are natural faculties underlying them. if this is correct, then there is 
no substantive difference between the views, despite the change of definitions. 
against this suggestion, i argue that in Leviathan, Hobbes has come to see that 
some of the most important social and political powers rest on interpersonal ef-
fects and a near total disconnection from faculties.
Honor is the key mechanism by which an individual’s secondary powers are 
produced from their faculties. in The Elements of Law, honor is the internal con-
ception of the superiority of another person’s power, and it gives rise to certain 
characteristic external actions (EL i.8.6). if i think someone else is more powerful 
than me, i will tend to defer to her, obey her, and be polite to her. For this reason, 
deference, obedience, and politeness are all signs of honor. it is clear that the 
deference, obedience, and politeness of others increase the honored individual’s 
40 The two passages stand in the same place in the text, after the discussion of the passions and 
before the establishment of the commonwealth; the internal sequence of the analyses of power are 
very similar (starting with natural power, then instrumental powers, then honor); many of the same 
examples are used.
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capacity to achieve her ends, and indeed, this behavior constitutes secondary 
power (favor and perhaps friendship) for the honored individual. as i argued, in 
The Elements of Law, an individual is truly worthy of honor only to the extent that 
she also possess power as a natural faculty. However, the honoring mechanism can 
malfunction, meaning that secondary powers can arise in the absence of natural 
faculties. if i defer to someone because i believe her to be superior in power, but i 
am mistaken in this assessment, my deference is no less real for its faulty grounds. 
in the early works, such secondary power grounded in error and not linked to 
faculties falls outside the scope of scientific analysis: they can be considered con-
tingent accidents41 that have nothing to do with individual human power. They 
are secondary powers but only in a degenerate sense; and they are presumed only 
to be a marginal phenomenon.
The crucial question for Leviathan will be whether this kind of power not 
grounded in faculties is a central or a marginal phenomenon. it is certainly no 
longer definitionally marginal. Honor is redefined as the manifestation of the 
value that we set on one another’s power, where value is “not absolute, but a thing 
dependent on the need and judgment of another” (L x.16–17).42 This redefini-
tion removes the distinction between proper and degenerate honor, and between 
proper and degenerate secondary power. The internal conception motivating the 
honoring behavior is no longer susceptible of truth or falsity according to some 
common standard; rather, it is a matter of individual judgment. even if the honorer 
values something other than faculties, and even if she is mistaken to think that 
the thing she values is truly present, her behavior is still honor and still constitutes 
power.43 Furthermore, i argue that this kind of power, where the connection to 
faculties is likely or certain to be lacking, is central, not merely definitionally but 
also substantively. it is given systematic privilege in Hobbes’s examples of power; 
the connection to faculties is replaced by a connection to the dispositions of other 
humans. reputation is only a tenuous sign of the presence of natural faculties, yet 
reputation is power “because it draweth with it the adherence of those that need 
protection” (L x.5).44 indeed more strongly, reputation is a power even when the 
reputation is contrasted to fact:
[W]hat quality soever maketh a man beloved or feared of many, or the reputation of 
such a quality, is power. (L x.7; my emphasis)45
even more strongly again, as is implicit in this quoted passage, the reputation 
need not even be reputation of having superior faculties; it could merely be a 
41 This is a term from the later De corpore, referring to those effects that are not related to the cau-
sality in question (Hobbes, Elements of Philosophy the First Section, Concerning Body, Chapter iX, Section 
10; latin text in Hobbes and Molesworth, Thomæ Hobbes Malmesburiensis Opera, Vol. 1).
42 On this new definition, there is also the change that the characteristic behaviors of placating 
and propitiating are no longer signs of honor, but they are honor itself.
43 Strauss observes a change in the relation between honor and power, and specifically the greater 
role for power; but he interprets this as Hobbes’s attempt to hide the humanistic moral basis of his 
thought (The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and its Genesis, 115n2, 169). On my reading, there 
is no such subterfuge, simply a change in the understanding of the human capacity to achieve ends, 
as i have argued.
44 This is also foreshadowed in De cive’s theology (DC xv.13), although not in its political doctrine.
45 See also L x.5–6, 8, 10.
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reputation of superior secondary power (L x.38). Thus, on the late view, power 
arises from a reverberation of appearances and reputations in a network of social 
relations: insofar as the power so generated has effects, it has full status as power.
an example is provided by Hobbes’s own canonical model of the common-
wealth. in what sense does the sovereign by institution have the same power to 
enforce covenants as a conqueror?46 The sovereign by institution does not pos-
sess overwhelmingly superior force as a natural person. However, when soldiers, 
guards, judges, executioners, and subjects in general play their commanded roles in 
wielding the metaphorical sword of justice and do not thwart its operation, anyone 
seeking to disobey will be punished. But why do the soldiers, guards, judges, and 
executioners do their part even though the sovereign does not personally have 
a sword to compel them? They do so because each of them believes that every 
other subject will uphold the command of the sovereign, including wielding its 
sword as commanded. This network of belief and compliance is a real power for 
the sovereign, no less than the direct superior force of a conqueror (L xvii.13).47 
as Hobbes remarks in Behemoth, “[T]he power of the mighty hath no foundation 
but in the opinion and belief of the people” (B 16).
even if power is often relationally constituted, might there be natural capacities 
or faculties that count as powers nonrelationally? To the contrary, exercising any 
capacity in a world populated by other people relies on their conduct, perhaps 
their aid but at minimum their non-interference. Consequently, in Leviathan all 
power is socially constituted. This is not the claim that natural faculties or capaci-
ties themselves are always socially constituted. Certainly, many capacities do not 
in themselves need to be understood interpersonally: the capacity to speak many 
languages, to run a four-minute mile, or to understand the natural world. rather, 
the claim is that if (as i have argued) power in Leviathan is human effectiveness 
toward ends, then even a faculty that is not intrinsically social will only count as a 
power insofar as it is socially recognized; being dishonored can vitiate the possibility 
of any natural faculties serving as a means to future apparent goods. For example, 
Hobbes considers science to be a small power, because even though taken by itself 
it enormously improves a person’s capacity to manipulate the world around her 
to her ends, it is not recognized as a power: “The sciences are small power, because 
not eminent, and therefore not acknowledged in any man” (L x.14). it is little 
use to the scientist to have a capacity to manipulate nature if the people among 
whom the scientist lives and works thwart her activities.48 Superior natural facul-
ties, which might constitute great powers considered in isolated abstraction, are 
useless in the real social world against well-developed secondary powers. indeed, 
the distinction between power and mere faculty is marked from the very start of 
Leviathan’s analysis. natural faculties are said to be power only insofar as they are 
46 L xvii.15.
47 Such power, though great, can be fragile: if i suspect others are about to shift their allegiance 
or otherwise cease upholding the sovereign’s power, then i may do so also, so as not to be aligned with 
a losing force. See my discussion of sedition in section 2.3.
48 is this a pointed criticism of Bacon’s view of scientific knowledge as power? Knowledge may be 
power, but it is insignificant in the context of human existence in society.
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eminent (L x.2): it is their prominence or conspicuousness that makes them a power, 
or in other words, the extent to which they are seen by others to be significant.
in Leviathan, Hobbes defines power in general terms: power is the means to 
“some future apparent good” (L x.1). Barry Hindess complains that goods are 
profoundly heterogeneous, and so accordingly are the means to achieve them; 
consequently Hobbes should not speak of power as though it could be uniformly 
comparable and homogeneous.49 However, attending to the interpersonal context 
of human action reveals that neither the means nor ends of power are so hetero-
geneous as Hindess contends. When Hobbes asserts that there is a “perpetual and 
restless desire of power after power,” the ends for the sake of which the power 
is desired should not be understood to be miscellaneous. The desire of power 
arises because each “cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he 
hath present, without the acquisition of more” (L xi.2). in other words, although 
i may also desire linguistic capacity in case i should want to converse, grain in 
case i should want to farm, a lawyer in case i should want to go to court, above 
all i want the single thing that allows me to live well now and to be able to satisfy 
whatever desires may arise in the future.
But is there a single thing that supplies this general power, a single means to 
this general end? My preceding analysis has shown that there is: for humans liv-
ing in a social world, socially constituted power constitutes a general means to 
future apparent goods. allegiance, having people supporting and assisting me in 
my ends, is a general power because the point of allegiance is to serve the ends of 
the person to whom allegiance is given, whatever they may be, over an extended 
period of time, and thereby gain favor. as Hobbes states, “Therefore to have ser-
vants is power; to have friends is power; for they are strengths united” (L x.3). This 
observation illuminates the problem with what i called the “positionality claim” 
of the earlier texts. according to that claim, even if a person’s power properly 
speaking is her natural faculties, her causal effectiveness lies in the superiority of 
her faculties compared to others. Two competitors race for an apple; if i am the 
slower runner then i do not get the apple. But speed alone will be the criterion 
of success only when the race is a well-regulated competition in which the rules 
are respected. Outside of this special case, my slowness may not prevent me from 
gaining the apple, for perhaps i have a greater band of friends or supporters will-
ing to help me and obstruct my competitor; or perhaps i have sufficient riches 
to buy the apple.50
To be sure, allegiance is not perfectly general in its effects. a band of lawyer 
friends does not help in a street fight, nor do streetfighter friends help in court, as 
Hobbes readily acknowledges (L x.16). However, this imperfection only becomes 
a major phenomenon when considering specific short-term ends. allegiance is 
very close to a general power when it is considered with respect to the enduring 
49 Hindess, Discourses of Power: From Hobbes to Foucault, 24–32.
50 For this reason, i cannot accept Macpherson’s argument that the relationality at stake in Leviathan 
is the same as the positionality of earlier texts (“introduction,” 34–35); see also lazzeri, Droit, pouvoir 
et liberté: Spinoza critique de Hobbes, 74n1.
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fundamental human end of security and the capacity to pursue future desires 
unmolested. To return to Leviathan’s account of riches, riches do not count as 
powers because they can be exchanged for specific goods: for Hobbes states that 
riches are only a power when combined with liberality (L x.4). liberality makes 
no difference to the capacity to carry out direct exchanges, but it does make a 
difference for allegiance. People desiring to advance or protect their own general 
power will give the possessor of riches their allegiance insofar as they hope to 
receive whatever unspecified assistance they may require from those riches in the 
future. liberality gives rise to this hope; illiberality quashes it (L x.4).
it is always possible to restrict one’s analysis to consider faculties or capacities in 
artificial isolation and to abstract away from this looser social context of allegiance: 
one can always consider the scientist apart from the mob, the race competitors 
apart from their supporters. This was the procedure of the early texts. But if the 
phenomenon to be explained under the rubric of power is human effectiveness, 
and if, as Leviathan’s account proposes, allegiance is the central determinant of 
this effectiveness, then such abstraction vitiates the analysis of power. On this new 
account, power is neither natural faculties nor any other attribute that could be 
neatly accommodated as a possession of the individual: human power lies funda-
mentally in relations.51 in contrast to De Cive and The Elements of Law, Leviathan 
finds an individual’s human nature and power to lie outside of her or him, both 
physically and conceptually, in her or his potentially shifting and relational social 
context.52 allegiance becomes the fundamental constituent of power: as such, an 
individual’s power may well fluctuate in ways beyond her control.
2.2
Hobbes’s new conception of power marks not merely a semantic or definitional 
change: to the contrary, i now argue that it gives rise to a substantively different 
social ontology. Where the discussion of power in The Elements of Law stressed 
the tendency of humans to isolation and fragmentation unless they are brought 
together in a formal union, now Leviathan’s discussion of power brings to the fore 
an opposite phenomenon. Humans have a constant tendency to form associations, 
some of which are politically significant even though they are not bound into a 
union. i argue that in Leviathan’s new social ontology, Hobbes envisages an active 
social domain from which groupings constantly emerge apart from any process 
of covenant, and in which inequalities are constantly generated.53
51 a similar argument is offered by rudolph. rudolph argues that from The Elements of Law to 
Leviathan, Hobbes moves from understanding appetite as a biological attribute to understanding it 
as socially constituted; correspondingly a move from understanding power as a drive to power as an 
acquired characteristic (“Conflict, egoism and Power in Hobbes,” 73–88; “The Microfoundations of 
Hobbes’s Political Theory,” 34–52).
52 against Oakeshott, who claims that Leviathan’s science takes the human individual in isolation 
(Hobbes on Civil Association, 32–34). Foisneau documents another respect in which Leviathan’s social 
theory moves to a more relational analysis: a change from justice understood in aristotelian terms as 
commutative or distributive, and injustice as tort, to justice understood as determined by a market, 
injustice as breach of covenant (Foisneau, “Leviathan’s Theory of Justice,” 105).
53 The new social ontology has only occasionally been noted. The work of Tarlton and Frost is truly 
an exception in this respect; see Tarlton, “The Creation and Maintenance of Government: a neglected 
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There is a curious difference in Leviathan’s account of the state of nature 
compared to the earlier texts. Hobbes still asserts that there is a rough equality 
among humans. However, this equality is not (as previously) established simply by 
appeal to the rough similarity of natural faculties. To the contrary, some people 
are “manifestly stronger” than others. despite this difference of strength, Hobbes 
claims that equality of power may be achieved by the weak confederating to counter 
the strong (L xiii.1).54 This suggests that associations are politically salient, and 
raises the question, might there also be associations that increase inequality rather 
than eliminating it?55 does this variation of wording truly point towards a changed 
social ontology? The possibility that there is no real difference is suggested by 
Hobbes’s reiteration of his view from The Elements of Law and De Cive that informal 
associations are so fragile as to be politically inadequate. in Leviathan, Hobbes 
reasserts that humans lack community compared with animals (L xvii.6–12), and 
that people in an informal association
can expect thereby no defence, nor protection, neither against a common enemy, 
nor against the injuries of one another. For being distracted in opinions concern-
ing the best use and application of their strength, they do not help, but hinder one 
another, and reduce their strength by mutual opposition to nothing; whereby they 
are easily, not only subdued by a very few that agree together, but also when there is 
no common enemy, they make war upon each other, for their particular interests. 
For if we could suppose a great multitude of men to consent in the observation of 
justice and other laws of nature without a common power to keep them all in awe, we 
might as well suppose all mankind to do the same; and then there neither would be, 
nor need to be, any civil government or commonwealth at all, because there would 
be peace without subjection. (L xvii.4)56
i concede that for Hobbes, humans desire security to “last all the time of their 
life,” and this requires a formal commonwealth; any temporary association around 
specific momentary purposes does not serve this purpose (L xvii.5). However, i 
dimension of Hobbes’s Leviathan,” 307–27; and Frost, Lessons from a Materialist Thinker: Hobbesian Reflec-
tions on Ethics and Politics, 131–72. even those who appreciate the interpersonal character of Hobbes’s 
later conception of power tend to attribute to him a consistent social ontology of power as fragmented 
and isolated. (See notably Macpherson, “introduction,” 55–56; Montag, Bodies, Masses, Power: Spinoza 
and His Contemporaries, 90–103.) Macpherson complains that Hobbes does not anticipate the forma-
tion of cohesive classes, and that he focuses too much on centrifugal forces rather than centripetal 
ones (“introduction,” 55–56; see also “Leviathan restored: a reply to Carmichael,” 383–85). But in 
this section, although i concede Hobbes does not consider class formations, i argue that Leviathan (L 
x) is very interested in centripetal forces. (in this vein, see Carmichael, “reply: Macpherson Versus 
the Text of Leviathan,” 391.)
54 Tarlton, “The Creation and Maintenance of Government: a neglected dimension of Hobbes’s 
Leviathan,” 311. it is common in the literature to miss this distinction, and still to claim equality of 
power in the state of nature. See for instance Martinich, Hobbes, 26; Pettit, Made with Words: Hobbes on 
Language, Mind, and Politics, 101–2; and read, “Thomas Hobbes: Power in the State of nature, Power 
in Civil Society,” 514.
55 Hobbes should perhaps have seen this problem for equality even in his earlier texts: for he 
acknowledges that there are families in the state of nature, and different sized families will have dif-
ferent power (EL ii.4.2). However, Hobbes does not make any indication there of being aware of the 
problem, perhaps because of his methodological abstraction to individuals considered “like mushrooms” 
(Hobbes, On the Citizen, viii.1).
56 in a similar vein, Hobbes characterizes life in the state of nature as “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, 
and short” (l xiii.9; my emphasis).
77hobbes  an d  t he  q u est i o n  o f  po wer
claim that Leviathan explores a new option for association that lies between a mo-
mentary association motivated by specific goals and a formal union for the sake of 
permanent security. This association oriented toward mid-range goals comes about 
in a new fashion, which correspondingly endows it with the possibility of durabil-
ity and political salience, even if not the supreme security of a permanent union.
Leviathan’s account of power gives systematically more emphasis to informal 
associations. in The Elements of Law, the positionality claim pits individual against 
individual, and the only salient possibility of human coalition is a formal union 
via covenant, a topic deferred to later in the book (EL i.8.4). By contrast, in 
the corresponding point in the text of Leviathan, Hobbes replaces the focus on 
fragmentation with aggregation.57 Hobbes asserts that the greatest human power 
is “strengths united” (L x.3); although one example of strengths united is a 
commonwealth united by sovereign covenant, he also explicitly countenances a 
compound of powers “depending on the will of each particular,” as for example 
friendship. That is, the greatest of human powers is achieved not only by a formal 
union bound by a permanent covenant into a single will; rather, it can also be 
achieved in an informal association where wills remain separate.58
in earlier texts, associations were formed by separate individuals’ agreement 
on specific shared ends. Correspondingly, whether because those ends were su-
perseded or because of other differences or passions, the associations tended to 
collapse.59 Leviathan by contrast envisages an alternative and anthropologically 
more deeply rooted basis for association. as i argued in section 2.1, individuals 
perpetually seek power by taking care to placate and propitiate (to honor) those 
whom they speculate could harm or assist their own ends. They seek to ally them-
selves in such a way as to advance and protect their ability to live securely and 
pursue their more specific ends. However, this very same behavior has an effect 
that is not necessarily intended either by those honoring or those honored: it 
constitutes patronage networks, security blocs, gangs of followers, and allegiance 
groups. in other words, the desire for power leads to the spontaneous formation 
of associations, superseding the rough equality of individuals with the inequality 
of more or less mighty groupings.60 For instance, recall that riches are a power 
insofar as they garner allegiance.61 When multiple individuals offer their allegiance 
to the possessor of riches, an association is constituted.
57 Both Mcneilly and Carmichael observe the account of The Elements of Law envisages universal 
opposition of powers, whereas Leviathan envisages limited opposition, including the possibility of 
friendship groupings (Carmichael, “Macpherson’s ‘Hobbes’: a Critique,” 361, 368–69; Mcneilly, The 
Anatomy of Leviathan, 144–47). Most other commentators consider Leviathan’s social ontology to be 
fragmented and isolated; see for instance Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition, 58–79; 
Oakeshott, “introduction,” xxxiv–xxxv; and read, “Thomas Hobbes: Power in the State of nature, 
Power in Civil Society,” 514.
58 in the latin edition, the greatest (maxima) power is the formal union of wills: a federation where 
wills remain separate is said to be second in power (proxima). nonetheless, the point of the english 
edition still holds: an informal union is a considerable power. indeed, by contrast in the earlier texts, 
it was not even possible to attribute a single potentia to an association.
59 See section 1.2.
60 L x.5–9, x.20, x.38, x.45. Hobbes adds other more specific tendencies relevant to formation of 
allegiance in his chapter on manners (L xi.4–5, x.7, x.16–18, x.27).
61 See section 2.1.
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Furthermore, these associations of allegiance have greater durability than as-
sociations for specific ends. The motivating desire of clients in these associations 
is not tied to transient specific goals, but to the perpetual goal of advancing and 
protecting their own general power. By consequence, the association so formed 
is potentially capable of motivating behavior over an extended period of time. 
Consider now the factors that destabilize associations even among those with du-
rably shared goals, notably envy and disagreement. These do not arise so acutely 
in spontaneous associations of allegiance and patronage. if i envy my partner in 
a cooperative enterprise and covet her goods, it may be impossible to continue 
cooperating; by contrast if i envy the wealth of my patron and covet her goods, i 
am likely nonetheless to continue to be her client in hope receiving some benefit 
(L x.19, x.23). if i disagree with my patron’s decisions but still hope to be favored 
by her, then i have a strong reason to put my disagreement aside (L x.28, x.30).
These kinds of association are not merely potentially stable, but they are also 
potentially very great powers. The Elements of Law asserts the positionality claim: 
powers cancel out each others’ effects. at the corresponding point in Leviathan, 
Hobbes notes the opposite phenomenon, of accumulation and increase: “For the 
nature of power is in this point like to fame, increasing as it proceeds; or like the 
motion of heavy bodies, which, the further they go, make still the more haste” (L 
x.2). The mechanism of this self-increase is social. allegiance is not only a power in 
itself, but it is also a sign of power. as a sign of power, it attracts honor, very likely 
in the form of more allegiance. X has a lot of friends, so i want to be her friend; 
y has henchmen, so i do not want to annoy her; i heard that people plan to back 
z, so i back z too: in all cases the reputation of holding many people’s allegiance 
leads to ever more people placating and propitiating, or in other words, to a big-
ger and more solid social grouping (L x.38).
To be sure, i am not claiming that these associations have a guaranteed stability. 
The very nature of their constitution carries a deep risk of instability: if my reason 
for offering my allegiance to a powerful individual or organization is my percep-
tion of her power and the likelihood of my benefiting from it, then should that 
perception change, i will withdraw my allegiance. Worse, given that my estimation 
of that power may be largely based on the evidence i see of others’ opinion of that 
power, if ever i suspect that others are shifting their allegiance, i will be quick to 
do the same. But the fact that these associations may be unstable does not prevent 
them from existing, and under many circumstances proving quite durable. One 
example that Hobbes considers at length is religious association. religion can 
give rise to durable social compounds that do not rely on sovereignty or punitive 
covenant, although they may subsequently be captured politically (L xii.12, 19, 
20, 21, 24).62 Further examples are seditious associations, and even the power 
of the sovereign itself, as i will show in section 2.3. These associations break the 
former equality of power: on the new social ontology, we see a much more uneven 
texture of social life. individuals are no longer largely equal in power: some have 
the allegiance and support of more people than others.
62 This anthropology of religious association was entirely lacking in the earlier texts.
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2.3
in his early texts, Hobbes presumes that the sovereign’s punitive incentive will be 
sufficient to render subjects obedient, and to bring its effective power to meet 
the power to which it is entitled. in this section, i argue this picture comes under 
pressure in his later civil science. For the changed social ontology envisages a social 
sphere much less amenable to decisive unification, and consequently forces a po-
tentially much greater gulf between the sovereign’s entitled capacity and its effective 
capacity. i argue that in Leviathan Hobbes addresses this problem by developing 
a dual science of politics.63 ‘Potentia’ now refers only to the sovereign’s effective 
capacity and does not purport to illuminate entitled capacity; entitled capacity 
or authority is now considered separately under the heading of the sovereign’s 
‘potestas’ or ‘imperium.’64 To be sure, the science of potestas is dominant in Hobbes’s 
works,65 explaining commentators’ neglect of his science of potentia.66 However, 
the development of a distinct science of potentia corresponds to a new understand-
ing of the problem of politics. The challenge for the political philosopher is not 
merely to establish a science of entitled power elaborated through a doctrine of 
right blithely assuming that effective power will readily follow; it is also necessary 
63 i concede that Hobbes’s explicit taxonomies of science do not list these separately (L ix). 
However, in Leviathan the two concepts are given distinct systematic treatment, unlike the early texts 
where they were conflated. Malcolm argues that Hobbes equivocates between understanding cause as 
the consequences of names and as the consequences of facts; correspondingly he offers two sciences 
of man confused together (Malcolm, “Hobbes’s Science of Politics and His Theory of Science,” Aspects 
of Hobbes, 155). against this view, i do not find confusion in Hobbes’s texts; rather, i agree with Math-
eron in finding two complementary analyses (“Spinoza et la décomposition de la politique thomiste: 
Machiavélisme et utopie,” 77).
64 in this light, it is a mistake to characterize Hobbes as the exemplary opponent of constituent 
power, as do Montag (Bodies, Masses, Power: Spinoza and His Contemporaries, 92–95) and Kalyvas (“Popular 
Sovereignty, democracy, and the Constituent Power,” 223–44). it is also an error to use analysis of De 
cive’s latin as a guide for the terminology in Leviathan, as Silverthorne does (“Political Terms in the 
latin of Thomas Hobbes,” 506–8).
65 especially in De cive, which lacks the elements of the larger system of science of the powers of 
bodies.
66 Many commentators simply neglect Hobbes’s account of the sovereign’s capacity, attributing 
to Hobbes only a juridical science of potestas (only a science of what ought to occur), for instance: 
Martinich, Hobbes, 43–53; Pettit, Made with Words: Hobbes on Language, Mind, and Politics, 115–40; 
Spragens, The Politics of Motion: The World of Thomas Hobbes, 112–24, 151–58; and Tuck, Hobbes, 64–76. 
However, there are several commentators who supplement their account of Hobbes’s juridical sci-
ence with a direct denial that he has a science of effective power. These include Goldsmith, Hobbes’s 
Science of Politics, 93–214, especially 176; Hindess, Discourses of Power: From Hobbes to Foucault, 35–39; 
Johnston, The Rhetoric of leviathan: Thomas Hobbes and the Politics of Cultural Transformation, 70, 122, 
215; Montag, Bodies, Masses, Power: Spinoza and His Contemporaries, 90–103; Oakeshott, “introduction,” 
xxvii–xxix; read, “Thomas Hobbes: Power in the State of nature, Power in Civil Society,” 514–20; 
Sorell, Hobbes, 8–21; and Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and its Genesis, 59–78, 169. 
rational-choice readers of Hobbes also only offer an account of authority. Kavka (Hobbesian moral and 
political theory, xiii, 19–20) reconstructs Hobbes’s “descriptive” theory of politics, as an account of what 
ideally rational agents would do. He then faults Hobbes for not giving an account of irrationality in 
his descriptive theory (438). But as i will argue, Leviathan’s account of the sovereign’s capacity power 
offers just such a descriptive theory; Kavka’s theory lies closer to the entitled capacity theory, which is 
what subjects would do if they always had sufficient rationality to obey. (See also Hampton, Hobbes and 
the Social Contract Tradition, 173–88.)
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to understand the real determinants of effective power as systematically and pre-
cisely as possible, in order to bring that effective power to coincide with right.67
Hobbes’s civil science seeks to explain the establishment and maintenance of 
peace and security. if the sovereign has power in accord with its entitlement (that 
is, if there is obedience), peace is achieved. if there is disobedience, the sovereign 
has less capacity than that to which it is entitled. Should there be a great deal of 
disobedience, the civil order degenerates into anarchy and war. nonetheless, in 
the early texts civil science takes the form of a science of the sovereign’s power 
(potentia) as a fictional person: an analysis of potentia as sovereign’s faculties (its 
entitled capacities from subjects), and not its effective capacity. Hobbes does not 
offer any systematic account of the sovereign’s effective capacity insofar as that 
may diverge from the capacities to which it is entitled. This is acceptable, because 
Hobbes claims that the sovereign will in fact have effective capacity commensurate 
to its right. First, he anticipates that in the face of the punitive incentive, subjects 
will generally hand over their power to the sovereign in accord with its right.68 
Second, the threats to the sovereign’s power are easily identified and controlled. 
The social order is understood as one of flat, fragmented equality of power among 
subjects, with no individual having sufficient power to challenge the sovereign. The 
only way in which the sovereign order is threatened is when subjects deliberately 
form a faction for the purpose of overthrowing the sovereign. Correspondingly, the 
commonwealth is secure so long as it can prevent the formation of such unions.69 
Thus although the science of the sovereign’s potentia provides an account of 
sovereign’s entitlement to rather than its achievement of obedience, divergence 
between these two will not be too grave.
in the view of the later text, Leviathan, there is a different and much graver 
threat to the commonwealth.70 it is posed by groupings that are mere associations, 
not unions, and that are not formed with seditious intent, but that simply emerge 
according to the spontaneous dynamics of the pursuit of power outlined in section 
2.2. Hobbes shows a new and persistent concern with eminent individuals, the 
immoderate greatness of towns, and the accumulation of treasure by monopolies 
or farms (L xxii.31–32, xxvii, xxix.19, xxix.21). The presence and perpetual emer-
gence of informal associations is newly recognized in Leviathan as a political fact 
to be dealt with, even though such associations fail in Hobbes’s view to provide a 
tenable alternative to sovereign rule. This concern is further developed in Behemoth, 
in which the wealth, influence, and popular support of religious groupings and 
great towns are identified as the matrix of england’s descent into civil war (B 3–4).
67 Frost’s analysis (with which i am otherwise sympathetic) is hampered by presuming a single 
unified use of the english term ‘power,’ and not observing its correspondence to the systematic latin 
distinction between potentia and potestas. She gives an excellent account of power as capacity, but 
presumes this also directly accounts for the sovereign’s authority or rightful power; see Lessons from a 
Materialist Thinker: Hobbesian Reflections on Ethics and Politics, 131–72.
68 as i argued in section 1.3.
69 as i argued in section 1.2.
70 Johnston also finds a change in the sovereign’s vulnerability: he argues the sovereign finds 
itself more sensitive to opinion (The Rhetoric of leviathan: Thomas Hobbes and the Politics of Cultural 
Transformation, 78–80).
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There are two reasons why these groups pose a problem, even though they are 
not formed for the sake of sedition. First, they provide means for sedition, if the 
intent does arise. in the early texts, the means of sedition are only secured after 
an active decision to form a faction for the purpose of sedition. in Leviathan, the 
means (power blocs not dependent on the sovereign’s pleasure) are always being 
generated, even without any seditious intent. Thus, should an ambitious individual 
develop seditious plans, they may already have at their disposal the means to put 
these plans into action; it will be that much more difficult for the sovereign to 
arrest these plans.
[P]opularity of a potent subject (unless the commonwealth has very good caution of 
his fidelity) is a dangerous disease, because the people (which should receive their 
motion from the authority of the sovereign), by the flattery and by the reputation of 
an ambitious man, are drawn away from their obedience to the laws, to follow a man 
of whose virtues and designs they have no knowledge. (L xxix.20)
The second reason why these groups are dangerous to the sovereign is even more 
serious. The existence of other powers within the social order in itself means the 
sovereign has less effective capacity. Powerful subjects tend to engage in the com-
monplace pursuit of advantage; they do not in general have the intent to seize 
power or to destroy the civil order, but they do want to have things their way. in 
particular, they think they ought not be punished, and hope to escape punishment.
and that such as have multitude of potent kindred, and popular men, that have gained 
reputation amongst the multitude, take courage to violate the laws from a hope of 
oppressing the power to whom it belongeth to put them in execution. (L xxvii.15)
The sovereign knows that when it wants to issue or enforce some command that is 
inconvenient to the powerful subject, it cannot presume it will secure obedience 
from that subject, and perhaps not from the subject’s supporters either. For the 
powerful subject and her or his followers have the power simply not to comply. 
They may comply in some cases, they may limit their reaction to noncompliance, or 
they may be provoked into hostile retaliation to teach the sovereign not to trespass 
on their concerns. This is vividly illustrated by King Charles i’s abortive attempts 
to impose the Book of Common Prayer on Scotland and to demand Ship Money 
(B 28–30, 36–37). in all cases, the sovereign’s power is weakened. it cannot simply 
ignore the fact of powerful subjects in society and make no concessions to them, 
because any successful display of disobedience publicizes the subject’s power and 
gains her or him even more allegiance. For this reason, crime from presumption 
of strength giving impunity is much more politically pernicious than the everyday 
crime from hope of not being discovered (L xxvii.30).
However, no alternative response from the sovereign is clearly better. For if the 
sovereign acknowledges the limits on its own effective power, it is drawn into a game 
of appeasement, which can only end badly. The sovereign may bestow benefits 
on a subject (whether exempting from punishment or making policy to please) 
“for fear of some power and ability he hath to do hurt to the commonwealth” 
(L xxviii.25). Such benefits are “extorted by fear” and are in this sense sacrifices 
that the sovereign “makes for the appeasing of the discontent of him he thinks 
more potent than himself” (L xxviii.25). However, this strategy does not encour-
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age obedience; quite the opposite, it encourages increased extortion, as Charles 
i found after his attempts to appease the Scots and parliament backfired71 (B 
75–76, 97–102, 115). For achieving the deference of the sovereign makes visible 
the subject’s power, garnering more allegiance. Seeing the sovereign’s weakness 
emboldens others to press for concessions too. This may defer civil war, “yet the 
danger grows still the greater, and the public ruin is more assured” (L xxx.24).
The lesson from this analysis is a dispiriting one. Power groups, once estab-
lished, cannot necessarily be eviscerated without negative consequences. instead, 
powerful subjects need to be cut down before their influence grows (L xxx.24). 
The problem is that this will be very difficult to achieve. First, Hobbes says subjects 
should be prevented from honoring fellow subjects, for this would constitute un-
equal powers not subject to the control of the sovereign (L xxx.8). But almost all 
social conduct has a valence as honor or dishonor, and so it will be impossible to 
eliminate honor entirely (L x.19–36). Second, functionally, not all power differ-
ences can be suppressed. The commander of the army needs to be popular to do 
his job, even though this is a danger to the sovereign (L xxx.28). Hobbes suggests 
that the sovereign can minimize the danger from the popularity of a subject by 
itself being popular (L xxx.29). But it is not clear how to become popular if that 
status is not already secured; for as already discussed, granting benefits extorted 
by fear is a highly dangerous political strategy, and pandering to the people does 
just this (L xxviii.25).
Thus, the new social ontology shows that the sovereign will face a constant need 
to maintain its power in the face of spontaneously emergent powers in the popu-
lace; such powers are a threat even when they have no seditious intent.72 While a 
sovereign can take measures to try to deflate and level out such powers, this will be 
an ongoing task for which success is uncertain. The result is that it is a challenge 
for the sovereign to achieve actual effective capacity commensurate to its entitle-
ment; peace is not so easily or definitively achieved as it was in the earlier texts.
The sovereign’s entitled power and effective power may diverge; this would 
be a problem for Hobbes’s science of the sovereign’s power as capacity (potentia) 
if it still attempted, as in the early texts, to illuminate the sovereign’s effective ca-
pacity to secure peace by laying out the sovereign’s fictional faculties (its entitled 
capacity). now in Leviathan, there is an obvious alternative strategy. For the new 
concept of individual human power (potentia) as effective capacity can immediately 
be extended to the sovereign. On the new account of individual human power, 
obedience is itself a prime constituent of power, rather than simply a recognition 
of a power (faculties) that exists independently as i argued in section 2.1. When-
ever one individual obeys another’s command, she gives power to the one she 
obeys (L x.20). To extend this analysis to the sovereign, all that is required is to 
consider the sovereign commander as just another person being obeyed, rather 
than in its fictional juridical nature. in this case, the potentia of the sovereign is a 
71 To be sure, Hobbes says the parliament also actively desired to usurp sovereignty.
72 i concede that De cive already displays an incipient worry with emergent powers even when they 
are not deliberately for the purpose of sedition (DC x.7). However, De cive awkwardly analyses this still 
in the language of formal unions, which is unconvincing for examples such as popularity and wealth 
(DC xiii.13).
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variable property: the capacity that it exercises through whatever actual obedience 
of subjects it is able to garner.
To be sure, there is a difference between the sovereign and any other figure 
that finds itself obeyed. For the sovereign is entitled to the obedience of subjects 
(L xvii.13–14). even if in fact its potentia is limited by a disobedient populace, it is 
entitled to have the greater potentia that would correspond to their obedience.73 
indeed, Hobbes understands the sovereign’s behavior in appeasing powerful sub-
jects as its behavior qua natural individual; this is contrasted with its power as the 
person of the commonwealth, by which it is entitled to obedience (L xxviii.25). 
The sovereign is so entitled not only because obedience has been promised to it 
through covenant, but also more importantly because natural law stipulates that 
such a covenant is needed for peace (L xiv.4–5). indeed, the early science of the 
sovereign’s power as a science of entitlement is retained, but now under heading 
of potestas/imperium. it is still very important to get this correct: Hobbes places first 
in his list of causes of the dissolution of the commonwealth the sovereign resting 
“content with less power [potestas] than to the peace and defence of the commonwealth is 
necessarily required” (L xxix.3).
The transformation of Hobbes’s treatment of power has far-reaching conse-
quences for his science of politics. Juridical arguments may generate an account 
of right and authority, but a cursory appeal to punitive incentives is insufficient 
to establish the possibility that political order under such a juridical model could 
stably exist. Where De Cive asserts that all commonwealths alike possess a stable 
potentia that is equated with their imperium, now the corresponding passage in Le-
viathan raises the concern that despite its stable potestas, a commonwealth might 
suffer a diminished potentia (DC x.16, L xix.4). in the later texts, establishing the 
correct doctrine of juridical potestas/imperium now needs to be distinguished from 
and supplemented by a difficult and quite separate analysis of how the concretely 
causal potentia to which the sovereign is entitled is to be achieved and sustained. 
effective power is no longer conceived as a stable possession but as a variable and 
relationally constituted effective capacity. This transformed conception of power 
illuminates the domain of lived politics below the neat categories of the juridical 
sphere, promising to offer a better understanding of actual dynamics of political 
stability, and what threatens it.74 
n o t e  o n  h o b b e s ’ s  t e x t s
Where possible, i have avoided using the Molesworth English Works / Opera Latina 
editions of Hobbes’s writings, given the inadequacies of those texts. (See discussion 
in Warrender, “editor’s introduction,” v, 34; Tuck, “introduction,” On the Citizen, 
xlviii; Curley, “introduction to Hobbes’ Leviathan,” lxxi.)
73 i stress, contra Frost (see n. 67) that authority or entitled power (potestas) does not collapse into 
effective power (potentia). it is true, as Hoekstra shows (“The De Facto Turn in Hobbes’s Political Phi-
losophy,” 33–35), that sufficient effective power grants sovereign authority (imperium/summa potestas) 
and insufficient effective power removes it. However, so long as effective power does not fluctuate 
below a certain threshold, the authority or entitled power of the sovereign remains stable.
74 i gratefully acknowledge support for this research from the Stafford Fund of the Princeton 
University department of Politics, and from an american Political Science association Travel Grant.
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although Hobbes’s language is gendered, his conceptual analysis is to a remark-
able degree ungendered, particularly by comparison with other canonical figures 
from the history of political thought (for instance, consider Hobbes’s refusal to 
naturalize the authority of men over women [L, chapter xx, sections 4–5]). Cor-
respondingly, while for the sake of exegetical clarity i make some concession to 
the original Hobbesian terminology (for instance, retaining ‘science of man’), oth-
erwise i will frequently reformulate Hobbes’s arguments in gender neutral terms.
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